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Abstract
Background Studies have been published regarding the impact of major system change (MSC) on care quality and outcomes, 
but few evaluate implementation costs or include them in cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). This is despite large potential 
costs of MSC: change planning, purchasing or repurposing assets, and staff time. Implementation costs can influence imple-
mentation decisions. We describe our framework and principles for costing MSC implementation and illustrate them using 
a case study.
Methods We outlined MSC implementation stages and identified components, using a framework conceived during our 
work on MSC in stroke services. We present a case study of MSC of specialist surgery services for prostate, bladder, renal 
and oesophagogastric cancers, focusing on North Central and North East London and West Essex. Health economists col-
laborated with qualitative researchers, clinicians and managers, identifying key reconfiguration stages and expenditures. Data 
sources (n = approximately 100) included meeting minutes, interviews, and business cases. National Health Service (NHS) 
finance and service managers and clinicians were consulted. Using bottom-up costing, items were identified, and unit costs 
based on salaries, asset costs and consultancy fees assigned. Itemised costs were adjusted and summed.
Results Cost components included options appraisal, bidding process, external review; stakeholder engagement events; 
planning/monitoring boards/meetings; and making the change: new assets, facilities, posts. Other considerations included 
hospital tariff changes; costs to patients; patient population; and lifetime of changes. Using the framework facilitated data 
identification and collection. The total adjusted implementation cost was estimated at £7.2 million, broken down as replacing 
robots (£4.0 million), consultancy fees (£1.9 million), staff time costs (£1.1 million) and other costs (£0.2 million).
Conclusions These principles can be used by funders, service providers and commissioners planning MSC and researchers 
evaluating MSC. Health economists should be involved early, alongside qualitative and health-service colleagues, as retro-
spective capture risks information loss. These analyses are challenging; many cost factors are difficult to identify, access and 
measure, and assumptions regarding lifetime of the changes are important. Including implementation costs in CEA might 
make MSC appear less cost effective, influencing future decisions. Future work will incorporate this implementation cost 
into the full CEAs of the London Cancer MSC.
Trial Registration Not applicable.
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 caroline.clarke@ucl.ac.uk
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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Key Points for Decision Makers 
The implementation of major reorganisations of clinical 
services can carry substantial cost, partly as financial 
expenditure and partly as staff time, spent within work-
ing hours and as discretionary out-of-hours effort.
We present a framework for costing implementation 
of major system change, suggesting what information 
should be collected and how/when/from whom.
This framework can support different stakeholders, 
including service planners, researchers, and policymak-
ers, to collect and analyse implementation costs that are 
often considered too complex to measure or excluded as 
sunk costs.
Cross-disciplinary collaborations involving health econ-
omists, qualitative researchers, clinicians, managers, and 
patients and the public are recommended for this work.
1 Introduction
Major system change (MSC) involves the reorganisation or 
reconfiguration of services at a regional level. Reconfigu-
ration has been defined as “a deliberately induced change 
of some significance in the distribution of medical, surgi-
cal, diagnostic and ancillary specialties that are available 
in each hospital or other secondary or tertiary acute care 
unit in locality, region or health care administrative area” 
[1]. A key reason why healthcare systems undertake MSC 
is the view that the new service configuration will result in 
improved clinical outcomes at lower cost [1, 2]. In particular, 
service centralisations, leading to fewer services providing 
specialist care to more patients per service, have been found 
to improve outcomes through improved quality of care, 
increased service volume and better trained staff [3–5]. If 
centralised services deliver improved care at a similar or 
reduced cost, potentially through economies of scale [6, 7], 
then the centralised model should be more cost effective 
than the preceding model. Clear evidence for this via high-
quality economic evaluations is however lacking, particu-
larly regarding implementation cost, i.e. the initial outlays 
required to effect change [8].
Economic evaluations of MSC tend to fall outside health 
technology assessment (HTA) and within service evalua-
tion, where evaluation of costs and consequences is often 
neglected [9]. Service evaluations preclude randomisation 
due to ethical considerations, as they are designed to assess 
the current standard of a service and not to compare tech-
nologies; hence, challenges exist in attributing causal links 
between service delivery changes and improvements in out-
comes [10]. Data collection can be challenging, with most 
MSC studies relying on patient-level data collected routinely 
or via audit systems [9]. A recent systematic review of ser-
vice centralisations found their economic evaluations were 
generally of poor quality, sometimes neglecting relevant 
outcomes, and not using statistical methods to sufficiently 
account for bias given the lack of randomisation [2]. Fur-
thermore, implementation costs of any type of healthcare 
intervention or service delivery change tend to be omitted 
from its economic evaluation [11]. In some cases, these costs 
can be assumed to be low, for example adding an uncon-
troversial drug to a procurement list. However, in other 
cases they may be substantial, for example due to training 
or engagement activities or acquiring new equipment. This 
is likely to be the case for MSC. Some argue implementa-
tion is a sunk cost as it occurs once, albeit over a period 
of time, and cannot be recovered. This however assumes 
that the change is already rolled out to all possible regions, 
which is unlikely to be true, and ignores different ways of 
implementing the same MSC, which might differ in costs 
and effectiveness. For the organisation deciding whether to 
undertake MSC, these upfront costs can be substantial and 
must be met.
Data on implementation processes may be difficult to 
obtain, and require additional skills and resources not nor-
mally associated with quantitative economic evaluation. 
Some information may be captured as part of research into 
organisational processes, although perhaps inconsistently 
and without yielding specific information amenable to cost-
ing. If consideration of resources associated with implemen-
tation is given only later in the evaluation, some information 
may no longer exist if the organisation has dissolved or there 
is poor organisational memory [12].
When evaluating complex interventions, the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) guidance [13] has implementation 
built into the research cycle, with iterative steps and data 
collection planned throughout, and an analogous approach 
has been applied in the development of our framework. 
While performing the economic evaluation work for stroke 
[12, 14], it became clear that having contemporaneous data 
collection would have allowed the possibility of conducting 
a bottom-up implementation cost analysis instead of top-
down. This work also showed a possible implementation 
pathway used in MSC and confirmed who were the rele-
vant stakeholders, both in National Health Service (NHS) 
bodies and allied organisations, regarding time and money 
spent on designing, planning, and implementing MSC. Pub-
lished work detailed in Sect. 2.1 was also used to further 
develop this framework [11, 15–19], and we incorporated 
feedback on draft versions of the framework from multiple 
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stakeholders as part of the RESPECT-21 programme (see 
Sect. 3.1) [20], as well as at the UK Health Economists’ 
Study Group.
The aim of this paper was to present the partly contem-
poraneous evaluation of the cost of the design, planning 
and implementation of MSC in specialist cancer surgical 
services in London [20] as a case study, demonstrating the 
importance of considering implementation upfront when 
designing economic evaluations alongside MSC. This work 
illustrates costs to be accounted for in planning MSC and 
the impact they might have on the cost effectiveness of the 
overall change, which is important for planners and com-
missioners. The case study, taken from the RESPECT-21 
programme [20], illustrates use of our framework, which is 
designed to help planners and researchers to elucidate the 
implementation pathway and to therefore consider early on 
what data to collect.
2  Principles of Costing the Implementation 
of Major System Change
2.1  Existing Frameworks for Incorporating 
Implementation Strategies into Economic 
Evaluations
Implementation science is “the scientific study of methods 
to promote the systematic uptake of evidence-based inter-
ventions into practice and policy and hence improve health” 
[8], and encompasses MSC, which aims to increase the pro-
portion of patients receiving high-quality evidence-based 
care in a region. The National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) recommends implementation costs be 
included in economic evaluations as sensitivity analysis 
[21], and comments that the cost of implementing a new 
intervention would be important for the organisation pay-
ing for implementation [22]. Systematic reviews found a 
limited number of economic evaluations of implementation 
strategies that were generally of poor quality and mostly 
not related to MSC [16, 17]. Hoomans, Severens and oth-
ers further highlighted the lack of evidence in this area and 
suggested establishing the net monetary benefit of the new 
intervention or system compared with existing or standard 
of care, and comparing expected benefit to calculated imple-
mentation cost to help making the implementation decision 
[11, 23]. Frameworks for calculating implementation costs 
have considered calculating patient-level costs to inform 
value-of-information analysis [18], and discussed data col-
lection and reporting in specific scenarios [15, 19]. We con-
sider it timely to develop these ideas further and provide 
researchers and health service organisations with a detailed 
and tested framework to apply to implementation cost analy-
sis in MSC.
2.2  Audience and Perspective
Key to any evaluation is identifying the intended audience, 
addressing the important question of the analysis perspec-
tive. This determines which costs and benefits are included. 
As stated by Meacock [9], HTA agencies such as NICE are 
not traditionally the intended audience of service evalua-
tions as they are not generally the topic of reimbursement 
decisions. This may have contributed to the lack of meth-
odological guidance [9]. The main audiences, and therefore 
perspectives, tend to be (a) local providers responsible for 
providing some or all of the services involved in the MSC; 
(b) a local/regional payer and/or health authority responsible 
for the planning, performance management and total cost 
of providing services involved in an MSC from more than 
one provider and usually across a whole system; and (c) 
national healthcare policy makers requiring information on 
the expected costs and benefits of providing resources for 
MSC who may prefer a societal perspective possibly includ-
ing wider non-healthcare costs. These different viewpoints 
are summarised in Fig. 1.
Evaluations may, from the point of view of a specific 
audience, be retrospective or prospective. In the retrospec-
tive case, the audience are interested in confirming delivery 
of expected clinical benefits of the changes and may prefer to 
focus on efficiency savings, rather than sunk implementation 
costs. Collecting and reporting this information can still be 
helpful for audiences weighing up the costs and benefits of 
undergoing a future MSC, where implementation is antici-
pated. For prospective evaluations and service planning 
where the audience are decision makers deciding whether 
to implement MSC, implementation costs can influence the 
implementation decision/approach [19, 24]. With a year-on-
year fixed budget, there is less interest in analyses focusing 
on cost-effectiveness thresholds per gain in outcome (e.g. 
quality-adjusted life-years [QALYs]), and instead greater 
focus on extra resources required, either upfront or over-
all. Hence, regional decision makers may prefer a budget 
impact, return-on-investment or programme budget marginal 
analysis [12].
2.3  Costing Methodology
Broadly, two main methodologies are available for costing 
implementation: top-down or bottom-up. Top-down cost-
ing, considering costs of specific ‘units’, e.g. salaries or 
consultation events, may be less precise here; staff could 
be responsible for a range of activities besides reconfigura-
tion, and event costs may reflect estimates only. This also 
excludes less well-defined costs, such as relocating staff and 
reorganising rotas and contracts. The strength of top-down 
costs however is that they can more readily and cheaply 
be calculated. Conversely, bottom-up costing (also called 
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Fig. 1  Framework and principles of implementation cost analysis in MSC. MSC major system change
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micro-costing) identifies each implementation component 
and assigns unit costs, requiring more resources and plan-
ning to conduct. Collecting this information poses chal-
lenges, and mixed-methods approaches, including realist 
reviews, qualitative methods or documentary analysis, may 
be required in addition to traditional quantitative methods.
Figure 1 sets out the framework and principles of bottom-
up implementation cost analysis in MSC, conceived dur-
ing our work on stroke [4, 5, 12, 14]. We list key costing 
components and considerations, with information on within 
which perspective they may be relevant, i.e. (a) local pro-
vider, (b) local/regional payer and/or health authority, or 
(c) national. The total implementation cost (adjusted to a 
common financial year) can be calculated as the sum of all 
implementation activities [sum of items (A) to (E) in Fig. 1]. 
Depending on the perspective, non-healthcare costs such as 
costs to patients (G) could be included, and the total could 
be annuitized [25] according to the lifetime of the changes or 
assets purchased (I), and divided across the relevant patient 
population (H). We recommend using standard accounting 
techniques and recommendations from Drummond et al. 
[25] to make the best estimate of the implementation cost, 
including appropriate methods for accounting for capital 
costs and assets, i.e. annuitizing over their lifetimes and over 
the lifetime of the MSC. Discounting of future costs and 
outcomes is not appropriate here, but would be applicable 
in economic evaluations looking at future costs and benefits 
with time horizons longer than 12 months, including for 
future implementation costs. We do not propose to include 
this kind of future discounting when calculating upfront or 
retrospective implementation costs. Variable costs such as 
tariffs (F) may be incorporated directly into the full cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) but not into the implementation 
cost. They are mentioned here in the framework as their col-
lection could more easily be done during the reconfiguration 
rather than after.
3  Case Study
3.1  Background to Case Study: RESPECT‑21
From February 2012 to April 2016, an integrated network of 
cancer providers in North Central London, North East Lon-
don and West Essex (initially known as ‘London Cancer’, 
population 3.2 million, 8 NHS Trusts) worked to centralise 
specialist surgery services for eight cancer pathways across 
urology, head and neck, brain, oesophagogastric (OG) and 
haematological cancer services [26]. Cardiovascular ser-
vice reconfiguration took place simultaneously [27]. The 
RESPECT-21 study focuses on four pathways: prostate, 
bladder, renal and OG, and includes full CEAs compar-
ing the new centralised services to the previous systems 
[20]. RESPECT-21 is a retrospective analysis but occurred 
contemporaneously with the MSC, allowing collection of 
implementation cost data, using the local/regional payer per-
spective (b) above in terms of the regional health authority, 
specifically what was London Cancer. RESPECT-21 covered 
similar changes in Greater Manchester, but delays meant 
that only London changes feature here. Reconfigurations 
involved the following moves: OG, from three sites to two; 
prostate and bladder, from four sites to one; and renal, from 
nine sites to one.
3.2  Methods for Case Study
3.2.1  Data Sources
Identification of components according to Fig. 1 used a 
mixed-methods approach. The team’s qualitative researchers 
undertook a programme of interviews and meeting observa-
tions and collected extensive documentation for qualitative 
analyses around process and impact on staff. Extra interview 
questions around financial considerations were included 
in collaboration with the team’s health economists, and a 
comprehensive timeline of events was generated. The health 
economist used this jointly produced work to identify and 
cost implementation events according to the framework, 
obtaining additional details and clarifications from NHS sen-
ior finance staff identified by the qualitative team as poten-
tial sources of further information. Documentary sources 
(n = approximately 100) included meeting minutes from the 
various boards that discussed aspects of the reconfiguration 
and some sites’ business cases (see Table 1). Further details 
on the qualitative aspect of RESPECT-21 can be found in 
recently published work [26]. Estimates of some details were 
made in collaboration with senior managerial and clinical 
staff from NHS and associated organisations where docu-
mentation was unavailable or incomplete. Published NHS 
salary scales for average relevant grades were applied to 
monetise estimates of staff time spent [28].
3.2.2  Board Structure
We included costs for boards where we could obtain evi-
dence or estimates regarding meeting frequencies and num-
bers, using information from minutes and attendees’ memo-
ries (Table 1). We did not include time spent by members of 
the public or local authority staff, as this did not fall within 
the cost perspective. Meetings were coded using the iden-
tity, number and type of NHS attendees, length of meetings, 
and the estimated proportion of time spent on the MSCs of 
interest, to generate a mean cost per meeting, which was 
multiplied by the total number of meetings to give the total 
reconfiguration cost per board.
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The landscape for the various boards is complex, and 
changes took place during the analysis period. An approxi-
mate and incomplete summary is this: the Cancer Com-
missioning Board (CCB) was established on 1 October 
2011 and attended by commissioners, holding full statu-
tory responsibilities from 1 April 2013. Work also started 
in 2011 under the London Health Programmes of NHS 
London (as was), and the Joint Development Group (JDG) 
for cancer, chaired by a senior commissioner, oversaw 
work to develop the specialist cancer reconfigurations to 
the point at which NHS East London region was insti-
tuted in June 2013. The Joint Cancer Cardiac Programme 
Board (JCCPB) took over from the CCB and JDG in 
2014 and oversaw reconfigurations in cancer and cardiac 
pathways. The London Cancer Board (LCB) was tasked 
in February 2012 with designing and implementing the 
cancer reconfigurations, and Pathway Boards were cre-
ated in 2012 by LCB to oversee pathway development. 
Pathway Directors and Managers were hired to run Path-
way Boards. Pathway Boards reported to the CCB then 
the JCCPB, including presenting Gateway Reviews that 
assessed and documented Trusts’ and Pathways’ readiness 
for reconfiguration. Operational Steering Groups (OSGs) 
for each Pathway met regularly from 2014 to 2015/2016 
to discuss the reconfigurations. The Cancer Unification 
Board (CUB), which discussed aspects of the reconfigu-
ration, met from 2014 to 2016, when its functions were 
transferred to the Cancer Vanguard Programme Board. The 
London Clinical Senate reviewed the decision-making pro-
cess. Some members of these boards were included in the 
‘Key Actors’ list in this analysis. Besides these boards, 
there were also local authority bodies, such as the council 
Table 1  Boards included in the implementation cost analysis, and the dates during which they were included
Some boards also existed outside these timelines
OG oesophagogastric, OSG Operational Steering Group, OSC Overview and Scrutiny Committee, LC London Cancer
Board Start date (or 
28 February 
2012)
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Health Overview and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs) and 
Joint OSCs, which included some NHS staff.
3.2.3  Implementation Timeline
Implementation activities for MSC can have (1) a ‘before’ 
period, when design and planning begins; (2) a ‘during’ 
period, often > 12 months, where initially only imple-
mentation activities happen but later both implementation 
and the new intervention occur simultaneously; and (3) an 
‘after’ period where the new intervention is happening and 
implementation activities have stopped. In our case-study 
scenario, the ‘during’ period for renal specialist surgery 
began on 1 January 2015, and for prostate and bladder sur-
gery on 1 July 2015, and ended on 1 April 2016 for these 
three cancers. The OG reconfiguration had only ‘before’ and 
‘after’ periods, as changes did in fact take place on one day 
(1 January 2016).
The start date for this implementation cost analysis was 
28 February 2012, coinciding with LCB’s first meeting after 
being tasked with leading the reconfiguration, and ended on 
1 April 2016, the start of the ‘after’ period for the three uro-
logical cancers. These dates (summarised in Table 2) were 
used for all four cancers, despite OG’s ‘after’ period having 
begun 4 months earlier, to simplify data collection. For the 
purposes of this retrospective evaluation, we combined all 
costs occurring during the 4 years into a single one-off cost, 
adjusted to a common price year, that could be applied at the 
start of the ‘after’ period in a future economic evaluation.
3.2.4  Data Collection and Cost Adjustment
The qualitative work identified boards, observed meetings, 
collected minutes, and interviewed NHS and related staff. 
Estimations of approximate total numbers of meetings per 
board during the timeline, by one author (CL), supplemented 
the documentary evidence (see Table 1). The average salary 
grade of meeting attendees was estimated as the midpoint 
of NHS Band 9 [29, 30]. Estimates of the costs of engage-
ment events were made similarly, using information from 
current and former North and East London Commissioning 
Support Unit (NELCSU) staff (the internal change support 
agency for the NHS), Transforming Cancer Services Team 
(TCST) staff, and other NHS clinicians and managers. Busi-
ness cases containing information on capital expenditure on 
equipment, facilities and other items were obtained from 
Trust senior finance staff.
Costs in categories A–E (Fig.  1) were adjusted to 
2017–2018 prices using the new Health Services Index 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI; Health), and the pre-
vious Hospital and Community Health Services indices [31, 
32], and summed to give total costs.
3.2.5  Incorporating Implementation Costs into Full 
Economic Evaluation
Certain considerations were made to ensure that the results 
of this implementation cost analysis would be suitable for 
inclusion in a full CEA. When calculating capital costs such 
as expenditure on new equipment or changes to buildings, 
we considered the potential lifetime of the asset and eventual 
resale value, and used these to annuitize implementation cost 
over these time periods [25]. We assumed that both the MSC 
and any capital assets had a lifetime of 10 years before they 
would be ‘replaced’ (Consideration I), and used interest rates 
that matched the standard future discounting rate of 3.5% 
per year used in standard economic evaluations where this 
implementation cost is expected to be used [33]. Sensitiv-
ity analysis was performed to evaluate the implications of 
using different lifetime durations. Total costs will be divided 
across the four different cancer specialities according to the 
annual incidence in the relevant population (Consideration 
H) for inclusion in the full CEAs for RESPECT-21, as these 
will be done separately for each of the four cancers.
3.3  Results for Case Study
3.3.1  Using the Major System Change Implementation Cost 
Framework
3.3.1.1 People’s Time Using board meeting minutes alone 
to calculate staff time was insufficient as staff also spent sub-
stantial time outside meetings. We therefore created a list 
of 19 Key Actors based on the qualitative work and addi-
Table 2  The implementation 
cost analysis ran from 28 
February 2012 to 1 April 2016 
for the four cancers
OG oesophagogastric
Cancer Start of design and 
planning (‘before’)
Start of implementation 
activities (‘during’)
End of implementation activities (‘after’)
Renal 28 February 2012 1 January 2015 1 April 2016
Prostate 28 February 2012 1 July 2015 1 April 2016
Bladder 28 February 2012 1 July 2015 1 April 2016
OG 28 February 2012 1 January 2016 1 January 2016 (1 April 2016 used here 
to simplify the data collection)
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tional conversations with key central figures and included 
a weighted portion of their salary and on-costs, on top of 
the time spent by other staff in board meetings. These Key 
Actors spent an estimated 12.5% (11 people), 25% (5 peo-
ple), 40% (1 person) or 50% (2 people) of their time across 
the four specified cancer reconfigurations. Time spent in 
board meetings by these specific people was excluded to 
avoid double counting.
On top of the above, other informal discussions and plan-
ning tasks took place among other staff. This would have 
constituted substantial time for clinicians and managers, but 
was not possible to quantify, therefore represented missing 
information.
3.3.1.2 Costs to  Sites We initially considered obtaining 
financial documentation from all 14 sites in the region to 
confirm expenditure, but conversations with key manage-
ment and clinical staff suggested no direct external expendi-
ture during the timeframe, except at the new prostate/blad-
der and renal specialist centres.
Some specialist renal, bladder and prostate surgeries 
are increasingly performed using robotic techniques, and 
replacement robots were purchased by two sites during the 
timeline of the reconfiguration study.
3.3.2  Results by Cost Component
All costs for components A–E (see Fig. 1) quoted in this 
section are unadjusted. Some board meetings straddled cost 
components A, B, C and E. They are all reported under C 
for convenience. Some costs covered all eight pathways 
across the five services listed above, some covered urology 
pathways plus OG (i.e. the four cancers of interest here), 
some just covered urology, and some also covered engage-
ment events or meetings where the cardiac reconfigurations 
were also discussed. The base-case analysis maintained that 
all costs collected were attributed to the four services of 
interest, regardless of any overlap with the other four cancer 
services or cardiac services, as it was not clear that costs 
for engagement events or consultancy providing transport 
analyses for example would have been reduced if only the 
four services of interest had been involved. Breakdowns 
and sensitivity analysis with some reductions in these costs 
where they were shared with cardiac reconfiguration are dis-
cussed below and in Sect. 3.3.4.
3.3.2.1 Component A: Options Appraisal As part of the 
appraisal process, work was performed at the NELCSU and 
by external consultants. This included a complex business 
case that included capital works across different hospital 
sites, programme management support, and competition 
(market) and transport analyses. The total cost was estimated 
at £1,850,000 across all eight cancers and cardiac services. 
The base case included this total amount, and sensitivity 
analysis considered including only half of this amount (i.e. 
half attributed instead to cardiac changes).
Regarding bidding preparations at prospective specialist 
sites, we obtained no information beyond some Key Actors 
writing bids as part of their role. These costs were therefore 
included within Key Actors.
3.3.2.2 Component B: Stakeholder Engagement There 
were two engagement phases: October–December 2013 
and May–June 2014. These were led by NHS England and 
Clinical Commissioning Groups and included workshops 
attended by clinicians and the public, as well as planning and 
engagement meetings with NHS staff. Provider staff time at 
workshops totalled 475 person-hours (£23,248) in the first 
phase (urology only) and 220 person-hours (£10,768) in the 
second phase (all eight cancers). A further 520 person-hours 
(£25,451) were spent in ongoing meetings covering the joint 
cancer and cardiac changes, and £23,713 was spent by the 
LCB on room hire, catering, etc. for events (all eight can-
cers). The base-case analysis included all these costs and 
there was a similar reduction made in sensitivity analysis for 
the overlap here with the cardiac reconfiguration.
There were no minutes available for engagement events, 
therefore information came from memories and calendar 
invitations from current and former TCST and NELCSU 
staff and mentions in various documentation, including 
archived news items. LCB direct expenditure figures came 
from a report discussed at a 2014 LCB meeting. We could 
not exclude Key Actors’ time here as event attendee lists 
were not available. No clinic sessions were cancelled for 
these events, and almost all occurred outside working hours. 
No distinction was made in this analysis between staff time 
spent during working hours and during leisure time.
3.3.2.3 Component C: Planning Meetings Staff, excluding 
Key Actors, spent an estimated 1459 person-hours (£71,309) 
on board meetings (four cancers of interest), including dur-
ing the options appraisal period (component A), the engage-
ment period (component B), planning and monitoring (com-
ponent C), and for auditing and monitoring performance 
(component E). Expenditure on internal change support for 
planning and monitoring totalled £100,000 (eight cancers 
and cardiac) with the base case including this total amount, 
and sensitivity analysis including only half of this amount 
(£50,000).
3.3.2.4 Component D: Making Purchases or  Hiring 
Staff There were some new hires later due to increased 
patient volumes at the specialist sites and some sharing or 
movement of surgeons between sites, but these were not 
included in the analysis: only one-off costs of new roles cre-
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ated specifically for the design, planning and implementa-
tion were included, and these were all included within Key 
Actors’ time.
Robots Two specialist sites obtained old robots from 
associated sites in the years leading up to the reconfigura-
tion, one for renal surgery and one for bladder/prostate. Both 
robots were later replaced, one in 2014 and one in 2017, 
and cost £1.9 million each, according to figures from the 
confidential business case for purchase at one of the new 
specialist sites. In the absence of information for the robot 
at the other site, it was assumed that its purchase price was 
the same. They were intended for exclusive use for these 
surgeries at each site.
Other equipment purchases For renal cancer, an item-
ised business case discussing the reconfiguration included 
£0.16 million for additional theatre equipment. There were 
some costs in OG of purchasing a new theatre kit at one new 
specialist OG centre for surgeons now operating at that site 
due to the reconfiguration, but specific cost information was 
unavailable. No costs of this type were reported for prostate 
or bladder cancer.
3.3.2.5 Key Actors The 19 Key Actors were assigned a flat 
percentage of their time on the reconfiguration of the four 
pathways over a number of years, summing to 10.7 person-
years (£1,081,602). Salaries were taken from budget docu-
ments or estimated from published figures in consultation 
with NHS colleagues.
3.3.2.6 Component E: Implementing Monitoring Sys-
tems Time spent on implementing audit and monitoring 
systems in board meetings was included under Component 
C. These covered the four cancers of interest only.
3.3.3  Other Cost Considerations
3.3.3.1 Consideration F: Tariff Changes Temporary top-up 
tariffs for robotic surgeries were used at the prostate/blad-
der and renal specialist centres. Changes in tariffs were not 
included in this cost analysis, but will be considered in sen-
sitivity analysis in future full CEAs.
3.3.3.2 Consideration G: Costs to Patients The perspective 
of this study was the regional healthcare authority (b), there-
fore costs to patients were not included.
3.3.3.3 Consideration H: Population of  Interest The rel-
evant population was the catchment area, or 3.2 million 
people. Patient numbers required for adaptation of this cost 
analysis for inclusion in the main CEA approximate to rela-
tive incidence rates of the four cancers for North Central and 
East London and West Essex. According to International 
Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision (ICD-10) codes 
and using 2017 figures from CancerStats (PHE, 13 Septem-
ber 2019), these were: 511 renal cancers (codes C64-66, 
kidney, renal pelvis, ureter), 343 bladder cancers (code C67, 
bladder), 2077 prostate (code C61, prostate), and 482 OG 
(codes C15–16, upper gastrointestinal).
3.3.3.4 Consideration I: Lifetime of  the  Changes The per-
spective of this study was the regional healthcare author-
ity (b), therefore we considered the implementation cost as 
a one-off cost, annuitized over 10 years in agreement with 
the estimated lifetime of the assets purchased (robots) and 
the MSC itself. We have not projected future costs of sub-
sequent reconfigurations; however, this could be relevant 
under the national perspective (c).
3.3.4  Total Implementation Cost: Overall and Per Patient
Total implementation cost was £6.9 million by expendi-
ture year or £7.2 million adjusted to 2017/2018 prices (see 
Table 3). This included some costs that could potentially 
be attributable to the cardiac reconfiguration or to the other 
four cancer pathways. Sensitivity analysis removing half of 
the shared costs where there was overlap with cardiac recon-
figurations reduced the total to £6.2 million in 2017/2018 
costs, mostly due to halving the Component A costs. In other 
reconfigurations, it is possible that such a large equipment 
cost might not be required; excluding the robot costs gave 
an adjusted total cost of £3.2 million.
Total costs per patient for incorporation into an eco-
nomic evaluation are reported in Table 4. The costs have 
been broken down by cancer type, given that the MSC will 
have a different impact on the costs and consequences/clini-
cal effectiveness for each cancer type in the ‘after’ period. 
The assumption regarding the lifetime of the MSC is likely 
to have implications for the economic evaluation, given the 
magnitude of the difference between the results for the dif-
ferent assumptions.
4  Discussion
4.1  Context of the Results
Based on a bottom-up, single-arm cost analysis, the design, 
planning and implementation stages of the reconfiguration of 
four specialist cancer surgery services in the London Cancer 
region cost approximately £7.2 million in 2017–2018 prices. 
A framework for calculating implementation cost for use in 
economic evaluations for MSC planning and other research 
purposes (Fig. 1), conceived during our previous work on 
stroke [4, 5, 12, 14], was used to guide the methods and 
analysis for this work. Considerations such as cost perspec-
tive (who is the target audience for the analysis), whether 
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Table 3  Breakdown of expenditure by year and type, for actual expenditure (Raw) and adjusted to 2017–2018 prices (Adjusted)
Expenditure for year 1 was from 28 February 2012 to 31 March 2013. Component A: options appraisal; Component B: stakeholder engagement; 
Component C: planning meetings; Component D: making purchases or hiring staff; Component E: implementing monitoring systems
Raw Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Total
Consultancy (A) £375,000 £1,200,000 £275,000 £0 £1,850,000
Staff time, events (B) £0 £23,248 £15,858 £20,360 £59,466
Direct costs (B) £14,863 £8850 £0 £0 £23,713
Staff time, Boards (A, B, C, E) £13,335 £15,064 £96,570 £46,340 £171,309
Staff time (Key Actors: A, C, D) £383,955 £239,555 £88,219 £80,344 £792,073
Other equipment (D) £0 £165,802 £0 £0 £165,802
Robots (D) £0 £0 £1,920,000 £1,920,000 £3,840,000
Totals £787,153 £1,652,519 £2,395,647 £2,067,045 £6,902,365
Adjusted Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Total
Consultancy (A) £400,824 £1,261,196 £285,879 £0 £1,947,899
Staff time, events (B) £0 £24,434 £16,485 £20,977 £61,896
Direct costs (B) £15,621 £9301 £0 £0 £24,922
Staff time, Boards (A, B, C, E) £14,253 £15,832 £100,391 £47,744 £178,220
Staff time (Key Actors: A, C, D) £410,396 £251,772 £91,709 £82,778 £836,655
Other equipment (D) £0 £174,257 £0 £0 £174,257
Robots (D) £0 £0 £1,995,958 £1,978,155 £3,974,113
Totals £841,094 £1,736,792 £2,490,423 £2,129,653 £7,197,962
Table 4  Cost per patient by 
cancer specialist area using 
a 10-year lifetime for both 
capital costs and non-capital 
costs in 2017/2018 prices as 
the base case, and over shorter 
and longer time horizons as 
sensitivity analysis
OG oesophagogastric, MSC major system change
a London Cancer population of 3.2 million
Renal Bladder Prostate OG
No. of patients per  yeara 511 343 2077 482
Capital costs £2,152,412 £282,898 £1,713,060 £0
Non-capital costs £762,398 £762,398 £762,398 £762,398
Lifetime of changes (years) 10 10 10 10
Capital costs per patient £421 £82 £82 £0
Non-capital costs per patient £149 £222 £37 £158
Capital costs per patient annuitized £506 £99 £403 £0
Non-capital costs per patient annuitized £179 £267 £44 £190
Total cost per patient annuitized £686 £366 £447 £190
Lifetime of changes: robot (years) 5 5 5 5
Lifetime of changes: MSC (years) 10 10 10 10
Capital costs per patient annuitized £933 £183 £742 £0
Non-capital costs per patient annuitized £179 £267 £44 £190
Total cost per patient annuitized £1112 £450 £786 £190
Lifetime of changes: robot (years) 5 5 5 5
Lifetime of changes: MSC (years) 5 5 5 5
Capital costs per patient annuitized £933 £183 £742 £0
Non-capital costs per patient annuitized £330 £492 £81 £350
Total cost per patient annuitized £1263 £675 £823 £350
Lifetime of changes: robot (years) 10 10 10 10
Lifetime of changes: MSC (years) 15 15 15 15
Capital costs per patient annuitized £506 £99 £403 £0
Non-capital costs per patient annuitized £130 £193 £32 £137
Total cost per patient annuitized £636 £292 £435 £137
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the analysis is prospective or retrospective, the lifetime of 
the changes, the relevant patient population, and how capital 
and non-capital costs are incorporated into the analysis all 
have important implications for how the cost per patient for 
use in an economic evaluation is calculated. These types of 
implementation costs have not historically been included in 
economic evaluations, but their inclusion can be important 
to decision makers, depending on the cost perspective.
We have produced a best estimate of the implementation 
cost, to be used in future work. We performed deterministic 
scenario analysis to provide alternative best estimates for 
alternative scenarios. We expect that a joint probabilistic 
sensitivity analysis would be performed when this imple-
mentation cost is included in a full CEA, as in that context 
there would be a research question to be answered, compar-
ing two alternative courses of action and requiring informa-
tion regarding their relative cost effectiveness.
4.2  Overview and Limitations for Case Study
There are a number of limitations to this cost analysis, the 
most important being the lack of counterfactual data as it 
is a single-arm analysis; it implicitly assumes that main-
taining the previous system involves zero cost, which may 
not be appropriate and also ignores other possible changes 
and innovations taking place at this time. The reconfigura-
tions were expected to deliver benefits in patient care and 
outcomes, and these will be assessed in RESPECT-21 [20] 
as part of a full comparative CEA per cancer, using patient-
level outcomes and resource-use data from the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ periods, in the reconfigured London Cancer region 
and the non-reconfigured ‘Rest of England’ region. Other 
limitations are that some work began before the analysis time 
period, especially in prostate cancer, and some potentially 
relevant costs appeared after the cut-off and were therefore 
excluded. For example, one non-specialist site hired locums 
for a while after moving services to the specialist site due to 
short-term difficulties in recruiting permanent staff, which 
incurred higher costs than filling permanent positions. Over-
sight and facilitation of ‘bedding in’ after the main changes 
had been effected could also be seen as a key part of imple-
mentation, but we captured only limited information on this 
in the form of staff time in component E.
In addition, the data collected were incomplete due to the 
timescales involved and the analysis complexity. Assump-
tions were made around how to attribute costs, unit costs 
used, and time spent by staff. Staff time is likely to be the 
biggest underestimate, as we could not gather accurate infor-
mation on exactly how long was spent discussing and reflect-
ing on planning and implementation decisions.
The inclusion of costs for robotic surgery implicitly raises 
questions regarding the relative cost effectiveness of robotic 
and traditional surgery, and there is limited evidence on this 
to date. In both renal [34] and prostate [35] cancer, there is 
some evidence that better clinical outcomes can be obtained 
with robotic surgery, and reduction in length of stay has been 
observed at these sites. Regarding reduction in length of 
stay, use of the robot to avoid open surgery with prolonged 
length of stay could be a contributing factor, and the budget 
for the purchase of the replacement robot was partly justi-
fied by the high case volume created through the service 
reconfiguration.
The impact of discontinuing specialist surgeries at some 
sites was also hard to measure. It could attract other inter-
ventions to fill the space, which may result in longer or 
shorter procedures and lengths of stay, different use of con-
sumables, loss of expertise in some fields and development 
of new expertise in other fields. No staff were made redun-
dant as a result of the MSC. They either moved to the new 
service or to other clinical areas. This may not be the case 
for other service reconfigurations in the future.
4.3  Limitations Regarding Onward Use 
of the Implementation Costs
The total cost of implementation is particularly important 
for a prospective analysis of a reconfiguration, where the 
audience of the analysis is one that is weighing up the costs 
and benefits of an MSC. The total outlay of costs is likely 
to be important in this context, to budget for the additional 
costs such as staff time and capital that will be required to 
implement the MSC. However, this case study is part of a 
retrospective analysis of a reconfiguration that took place in 
London Cancer, where the aim was to evaluate the clinical 
and cost effectiveness of the MSC, including the implemen-
tation cost in the ‘after’ group in the reconfigured region.
The theoretical basis for deciding the cost year and annu-
itizing non-capital costs requires careful consideration in 
each individual case, in terms of when the expenditure is 
likely to take place. In the case study reported here, the 
choice to annuitize the implementation had little impact on 
the total per-patient cost, but assumptions regarding the life-
time of the MSC were important. However, the implications 
for the results of the full economic evaluation subsequently 
being performed for RESPECT-21 remain to be seen. It is 
possible, for example, that incidence rates and total popula-
tion might change over time.
The aims of this paper were to illustrate the importance 
of implementation costs for MSC, with a view to inclusion 
in a full CEA, as well as discuss how relevant costs for cap-
ture can be categorised to frame discussions with colleagues 
during data collection, and we have presented them in our 
framework for application by planners and researchers in 
the future in similar MSC contexts. Certain items are very 
specific to this context, namely the replacement robots, and 
some are more widely applicable, i.e. staff time, consultancy 
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fees, and engagement activities. We annuitized costs accord-
ing to the estimated lifetime of assets and MSC, and varied 
this in sensitivity analysis. We note that the perspective of 
RESPECT-21’s main CEAs will be that of the NHS and 
Personal Social Services [i.e. perspective (c)], therefore we 
will consider how to include assets, as costs of the robots to 
the NHS were also partly accounted for via temporary tariff 
changes at some of the specialist sites.
Use of the framework principles and components 
described above greatly facilitated data collection across 
the various NHS services and sites. We have broken down 
the implementation costs into categories (see Sect. 3.3.2 and 
Table 3) that we hope will assist future service designers 
and planners, as well as researchers, in making estimates 
of the likely costs of implementation, ahead of performing 
their own MSC.
5  Conclusions
This was the first time this framework (Fig. 1), conceived 
during the stroke reconfiguration, was used to explore and 
capture the components and costs of designing, planning 
and implementing MSC. We have provided a model scenario 
describing the investigation of these costs.
Inclusion of implementation costs in CEA is likely to 
make MSC appear less cost effective, potentially influencing 
future decisions regarding MSC. Regional and subregional 
decision-making is likely to become more prevalent with 
increased devolution of the type currently underway in Eng-
land, thus making these types of implementation cost analy-
sis at these levels even more relevant and important in future 
as regional authorities aim to harmonise MSC planning.
Implementation is often thought of as a ‘black box’ and 
not fully investigated. With this work, we have begun to 
explore the components and associated costs of designing, 
planning and implementing MSC, and their presentation, yet 
there is still further work to be done. It is often assumed that 
implementation costs can be ignored and we hope that this 
work goes some way towards challenging this assumption.
Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge the contribution made 
to this work by Neil Cameron, one of the patient representatives on this 
study, who sadly died in May 2017. They also thank Victoria Wood, 
Catherine Perry, Ruth Boaden, Veronica Brinton, David Holden, Pat-
rick Fahy, Michael Aitchison, Colin Jackson, Christine Taylor and Pei 
Li Ng for their contributions to the development of this study. The 
authors are also grateful to all the NHS, NELCSU, TCST and other 
staff and colleagues who have contributed data and information and 
their time and expertise for this analysis. Thanks also to Rachel Mea-
cock for her discussion of an earlier draft of this paper at the Health 
Economists’ Study Group meeting in June 2018, and the audience of 
that session for their insightful comments.
Declarations 
Funding This paper presents independent research commissioned by 
the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Services and 
Delivery Research Programme, funded by the Department of Health 
and Social Care (study reference 14/46/19). NJF is an NIHR Senior 
Investigator. The views expressed are those of the authors and not nec-
essarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health and 
Social Care.
Conflict of interest Axel Bex reports grants from Pfizer and trial in-
volvement with BMS and Roche/Genentech, outside the submitted 
work. Rachael M. Hunter reports grants from the NIHR Health Servic-
es and Delivery Research Programme during the conduct of the study. 
Caroline S. Clarke, Cecilia Vindrola-Padros, Claire Levermore, Angus 
I.G. Ramsay, Georgia B. Black, Kathy Pritchard-Jones, John Hines, 
Gillian Smith, Muntzer Mughal, David Shackley, Mariya Melnychuk, 
Steve Morris and Naomi J. Fulop have nothing to disclose.
Ethics approval and consent to participate This study was reviewed 
and approved by the Proportionate Review Subcommittee of the NRES 
Committee Yorkshire and the Humber—Leeds (reference number: 15/
YH/0359).
Availability of data and material The datasets generated and/or ana-
lysed during the current study are not shareable due to confidentiality.
Code availability Not applicable.
Author contributions CSC led the quantitative data gathering and 
analysis. RMH wrote the first draft of the paper, and CSC and RMH 
performed subsequent drafts of the paper. RMH, CSC, SM, MMe and 
NJF developed the analysis within the context of the wider study. CVP 
and AIGR led the qualitative data gathering for the documentary analy-
sis. CVP, GBB, CVP, AIGR and CSC led the work on coding board 
meeting minutes. CL and CSC led the work on salaries. KPJ, CL, JH, 
AB, DS, GS and MMu contributed data sources and knowledge of 
clinical aspects and managerial oversight of the MSC. NJF led the 
overall RESPECT-21 mixed-methods study. All authors contributed 
to the study design, and commented on drafts and approved the final 
manuscript.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License, which permits any 
non-commercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the 
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other 
third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative 
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons 
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regula-
tion or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit 
http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by- nc/4. 0/.
References
 1. Fulop N, Walters R, Spurgeon PP. Implementing changes to hospi-
tal services: factors influencing the process and ‘results’ of recon-
figuration. Health Policy. 2012;104:128–35.
809How to Cost the Implementation of Major System Change for Economic Evaluations
 2. Bhattarai N, McMeekin P, Price C, Vale L. Economic evaluations 
on centralisation of specialised healthcare services: a systematic 
review of methods. BMJ Open. 2016;6:e011214.
 3. Darzi A. Healthcare for London: a framework for action. 2nd ed. 
London: NHS; 2007.
 4. Morris S, Hunter RM, Ramsay AIG, Boaden R, McKevitt C, Perry 
C, et al. Impact of centralising acute stroke services in English 
metropolitan areas on mortality and length of hospital stay: dif-
ference-in-differences analysis. BMJ Open. 2014;349:g4757.
 5. Ramsay AIG, Morris S, Hoffman A, Hunter RM, Boaden R, McK-
evitt C, et al. Effects of centralizing acute stroke services on stroke 
care provision in two large metropolitan areas in England. Stroke. 
2015;46:2244–51.
 6. Posnett J. The hospital of the future: is bigger better? Concentra-
tion in the provision of secondary care. BMJ. 1999;319:1063–5.
 7. Imison C, Sonola L, Honeyman M, Ross S. The reconfiguration 
of clinical services. What is the evidence? London: The King’s 
Fund; 2014.
 8. Foy R, Sales A, Wensing M, Aarons GA, Flottrop S, Kent B, et al. 
Implementation science: a reappraisal of our journal mission and 
scope. Implement Sci. 2015;10:51.
 9. Meacock R. Methods for the economic evaluation of changes 
to the organisation and delivery of health services: principal 
challenges and recommendations. Health Econ Policy Law. 
2019;14:119–34.
 10. NHS Health Research Authority (HRA). Defining Research. 
Research Ethics Service; 2017.
 11. Hoomans T, Severens JL. Economic evaluation of implementation 
strategies in health care. Implement Sci. 2014;9:168.
 12. Hunter RM, Fulop NJ, Boaden RJ, McKevitt C, Perry C, et al. The 
potential role of cost-utility analysis in the decision to implement 
major system change in acute stroke services in metropolitan areas 
in England. Health Res Policy Syst. 2018;16:23.
 13. Craig P, Dieppe P, Macintyre S, Michie S, Nazareth I, Petticrew 
M. Developing and evaluating complex interventions: the new 
Medical Research Council guidance. BMJ. 2008;337:a1655.
 14. Hunter RM, Davie C, Rudd A, Thompson A, Walker H, Thomson 
N, et al. Impact on clinical and cost outcomes of a centralized 
approach to Acute Stroke Care in London: a comparative effec-
tiveness before and after model. PLoS One. 2013;8(8):e70420.
 15. Imperial College London and Peter Sowerby Foundation. A frame-
work for evaluating the economic impact of Electronic Health 
Record based interventions. 2017.
 16. Vale L, Thomas R, MacLennan G, Grimshaw J. Systematic review 
of economic evaluations and cost analyses of guideline implemen-
tation strategies. Eur J Health Econ. 2007;8:111–21.
 17. Hoomans T, Evers SMAA, Ament AJHA, Hübben MWA, van der 
Weijden T, Grimshaw JM, et al. The methodological quality of 
economic evaluations of guideline implementation into clinical 
practice: a systematic review of empirical studies. Value Health. 
2007;10:305.
 18. Fenwick E, Claxton K, Sculpher M. The value of implementation 
and the value of information: combined and uneven development. 
Med Decis Mak. 2008;28:21–32.
 19. O’Beirne M, Reid R, Zwicker K, Sterling P, Sokol E, Flemons 
W, et al. The costs of developing, implementing and operating 
a safety learning system in community practice. J Patient Saf. 
2013;9:211.
 20. Fulop NJ, Ramsay AIG, Vindrola-Padros C, Aitchison M, Boaden 
RJ, Brinton V, et al. Reorganising specialist cancer surgery for the 
twenty-first century: a mixed methods evaluation (RESPECT-21). 
Implement Sci. 2016;11:155.
 21. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Interim 
methods guide for developing service guidance 2014 (PMG8). 
NICE; 2014.
 22. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Devel-
oping NICE guidelines: the manual (PMG20). NICE; 2014, 
updated 2018.
 23. Severens JL, Hoomans T, Adang E, Wensing M. Economic evalu-
ation of implementation strategies (chapter 23). In: Wensing M, 
Grol R, Grimshaw J, editors. Improving patient care: the imple-
mentation of change in health care. 3rd ed. Oxford: Wiley; 2020.
 24. Turner S, Ramsay A, Perry C, Boaden R, McKevitt C, Morris S, 
et al. Lessons for major system change: centralization of stroke 
services in two metropolitan areas of England. J Health Serv Res 
Policy. 2016;21:156–65.
 25. Drummond MF, Sculpher MJ, Torrance GW, O’Brien BJ, Stod-
dart GL. Methods for the economic evaluation of health care pro-
grammes. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2015.
 26. Vindrola-Padros C, Ramsay AI, Perry C, Darley S, Wood VJ, 
Clarke CS, et al. Implementing major system change in specialist 
cancer surgery: the role of provider networks. J Health Serv Res 
Policy. 2021;26(1):4–11.
 27. NHS England. Improving Specialist Cancer and Cardiovascular 
Services in North and East London and West Essex: Business 
Case; 2014.
 28. NHS Employers. NHS Terms and Conditions of Service Hand-
book. NHS Employers; 2019.
 29. NHS Employers. Pay and Conditions Circular (M&D) 1/2017. 
NHS Employers; 2017.
 30. NHS England. NHS Terms and Conditions of Service Handbook, 
Amendment number 36, Pay and conditions circulars (AfC) num-
ber 1/2016 and number 2/2016. NHS England; 2016.
 31. LA Curtis, A Burns. Unit Costs of Health and Social Care 2015. 
Canterbury: PSSRU; 2015.
 32. LA Curtis, A Burns. Unit Costs of Health and Social Care 2018. 
Canterbury: PSSRU; 2018.
 33. NICE. Guide to the methods of technology appraisal. 2013. 
https:// www. nice. org. uk/ proce ss/ pmg9. Accessed 3 Jan 2018.
 34. Giovanni CE, Medina LG, Gill T, Abreu A, Sotelo R, Artibani 
W, et al. Impact of surgical factors on robotic partial nephrectomy 
outcomes: comprehensive systematic review and meta-analysis. J 
Urol. 2018;200:258–74.
 35. Ramsay C, Pickard R, Robertson C, Close A, Vale L, Armstrong 
N, et al. Systematic review and economic modelling of the relative 
clinical benefit and cost-effectiveness of laparoscopic surgery and 
robotic surgery for removal of the prostate in men with localised 
prostate cancer. Health Technol Assess. 2012;16(41):1–313.
Authors and Affiliations
Caroline S. Clarke1  · Cecilia Vindrola‑Padros2  · Claire Levermore3 · Angus I. G. Ramsay2  · Georgia B. Black2  · 
Kathy Pritchard‑Jones3,4  · John Hines3,5,6 · Gillian Smith7 · Axel Bex7 · Muntzer Mughal3 · David Shackley8,9 · 
Mariya Melnychuk2 · Steve Morris10  · Naomi J. Fulop2  · Rachael M. Hunter1
1 Research Department of Primary Care and Population 
Health, University College London, London, UK
2 Department of Applied Health Research, University College 
London, London, UK
810 C. S. Clarke et al.
3 University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, 
London, UK
4 UCL Partners Academic Health Science Network, London, 
UK
5 London Cancer, University College London, Cancer 
Collaborative, London, UK
6 Barts Health NHS Trust, London, UK
7 Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK
8 Greater Manchester Cancer, (hosted by) Christie NHS 
Foundation Trust, Manchester, UK
9 Manchester Academic Health Science Centre, University 
of Manchester, Manchester, UK
10 Primary Care Unit, Department of Public Health and Primary 
Care, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
